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 Chapter 14 – The Age of America  
 
Administration and policy  
The year 1984 not only inaugurated Australia’s rebirth as an imperial 
auxiliary, beholden to the economic might of the United States. It also 
began a new phase in the Commonwealth’s administration of copyright 
laws. In 1984, the Copyright Law Review Committee, an occasional 
committee of experts supported by the Attorney General’s 
Department, presented its first report to the Attorney on the legal 
meaning of publication.  
Until its abolition in 2005, the CLRC reported on 11 other occasions, 
making recommendations on diverse subject matter ranging from 
moral rights to simplification of the Copyright Act and Crown 
copyright. The Committee followed in the tradition of the Spicer and 
Franki committees, reporting – to much more confined effect – on 
matters of mainly domestic concern, and proposing legislative 
improvements. Separately, different Attorneys commissioned reports 
on new communications, copyright collecting societies and the 
competitive effect of intellectual property legislation.  
This burst of activity reflected a larger dynamism, which grew out of 
the efflorescence of American power in international trade politics. In 
the space of a few years, from the beginning of the Uruguay Round of 
GATT trade talks in 1987, to the formation of the World Trade 
Organization in 1994, and the signing of WIPO’s Copyright Treaty in 
1996,1 the United States inspired the transformation of international 
copyright law. After the last milestone, countries like Australia rapidly 
passed legislation recognising new copyright protections and remedies 
for infringement.  
Role of the federal Attorney General’s Department 
In this period, the Attorney General’s Department stepped out of the 
shadow cast by larger departments tending to the legislation, policies 
and international agreements vital to Australia’s welfare. It presented 
                                                     
1 Also the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty adopted 20 December 
1996. 
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itself as the sophisticated interpreter of international consensus on 
copyright principles, and, unwittingly, began to fill the role of 
Australian amanuensis to the United States, the power across-the-seas. 
At the time of the Franki Report, about three lawyers of the Attorney 
General’s Department tended to copyright policy matters. In 1968, the 
Labor MP Gil Duthie, praised the department’s tiny band of copyright 
lawyers for their extraordinary achievement in bringing the Copyright 
Bill rapidly to fruition. In the years after 1984, the number of lawyers 
employed to administer the Copyright Act, and carry out various policy 
functions, multiplied. The intellectual property branch, later renamed 
the copyright branch, grew in size about fivefold. 
In the eyes of government, it was a powerhouse of specialist expertise. 
Others chafed at the department’s orthodoxy, which rigidly reflected 
the international consensus in favour of owners’ rights. While 
departmental lawyers were exceptionally able in statutory interpretation 
and the analysis of legal principle, they were deficient in their 
understanding of the historical context in which principles emerged. 
They could not look beyond the narrow prescriptions of international 
copyright lawmakers, led by the US, to fathom how and why the laws 
of copyright really came to be made. As a result, their policy judgments 
were sterile and they discounted valid arguments against optimal 
interpretations of proprietary rights. 
As copyright laws grew in complexity after 1984, as the trade concerns 
of the United States came to dominate international copyright 
discourse, as the global economy based on the supply and consumption 
of copyright products grew in value and prominence, a copyright 
sodality preached in Australia a doctrine of legislative necessity. 
According to the ACC, CAL, APRA, ARIA, the Business Software 
Alliance, the Motion Picture Association and so on, Australia must 
zealously reform and augment its copyright laws or perish in the desert 
of international disrepute.  
It fell to the Attorney General’s Department to translate international 
norms into domestic legislation, to mediate between the interests of 
copyright owners and users, to maintain the so-called balance between 
the interests of these protagonists in the copyright drama, and to 
position Australia to participate in the copyright world’s American 
peace.  
In the airless atmosphere of policymaking, the urge for conformity 
suffocated debate. Departmental officers diligently reported the views 
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of copyright user groups but they honoured above all the imperative 
declared by the United States Trade Representative: reform your laws 
to extend and protect the rights of copyright industries or suffer 
isolation, irrelevance and economic retardation. 
Why they acted in this way is not hard to fathom. Lawyers are trained 
in exegesis not historical analysis. Those inclined to doubt received 
wisdom or the numinous character of legislation rarely find 
employment in government legal departments. The officers of the 
Attorney General’s Department worked conscientiously and 
competently, trying to steer a middle course between opposed factions. 
But their thinking lacked the vital spark of originality and they endorsed 
historically inaccurate presumptions about the purpose of copyright.  
Unconsciously, they favoured the idea that copyright law is designed to 
encourage production. To optimise output, new laws must refine, add 
to, and sometimes qualify rights as international agreements demand. 
The necessity for alteration outside international law, or the content of 
principles adopted, did not concern them. Implicitly, they accepted that 
copyright laws must increase to protect the interests of copyright 
owners, and those interests became their intrinsic concern. 
This favouritism reflects nothing on the legal ability of departmental 
lawyers or their motives. The Berne Convention and later copyright 
agreements, once ratified, demanded legislative action to implement 
agreed principles. The Attorney General’s Department could not 
support the undermining of agreed principles. But in the department’s 
policy hothouse, arguments in favour of permissible qualifications to 
proprietary rights usually wilted. 
Participation in international conferences and approach 
of Attorney General’s Department 
The participation of departmental officers in international copyright 
lawmaking reinforced the unwillingness to challenge conventional 
thinking, and interpret accords in new ways. Officers’ attendance at 
international conferences, beginning in the 1960s, exercised a powerful 
influence in shaping the department’s narrow interpretive outlook. This 
outlook represented something new in Australian policy thinking. Until 
the 1960s, Australia did not align itself to the thinking of the 
international copyright bureaucracy. Its representatives to conferences 
of the Berne Union were men of noticeable intellectual independence. 
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Sir William Harrison Moore, Australia’s delegate at the Berne Union’s 
1928 Rome Conference, could count as academic disciples two future 
High Court judges, Latham and Dixon. An outstanding constitutional 
law scholar, much in demand during the Federation debates, he might, 
at a pinch, accept temporary subordinate status to Government 
Ministers. He felt no such obligation to anyone else. W J Dignam, KC, 
the High Commissioner to Ireland, also a constitutional law expert, 
represented Australia at the Berne Union’s Brussels Conference in 
1948.2 In his report of the Conference, he openly criticised the policy 
and tactics of the British and various other delegations.  
Afterwards, attitudes changed. Senior officers of the Attorney General’s 
Department first represented Australia at the Stockholm revision 
Conference of 1967. From that year onwards, a shift to conformity not 
evident in the conference reports of either Moore or Dignam (or in 
their conduct at the conferences) is suddenly discernible. Very 
gradually, the weight of international conformism began to exert more 
and more centrifugal force on domestic activities.  
Once the Attorney General’s Department began to represent Australia 
internationally, a strong drive for harmonisation on the lines expected 
by copyright owners became inevitable. Conformity did not result only 
from the conservatism inculcated by legal training. The department’s 
extreme orthodoxy in matters which admitted a variety of 
interpretations extended back to its beginnings in 1901, and owed 
something to the personality of its first head, the plain-thinking Robert 
Garran. Garran led the department for 31 years and impressed his own 
stamp of caution and pragmatism on its practices.3 
Under his leadership, the department consolidated its hold over the 
management of intellectual policy legislation. It exercised administrative 
responsibility for copyright legislation from 1907, managing the 
registration of copyrights through a controlled agency, the Copyright 
Office. In the 1920s, matters of copyright policy were handled directly 
by the Attorney General John Latham and Latham continued to drive 
                                                     
2 The Department of External Affairs, not the Attorney General’s Department, 
held responsibility for Australian participation at the Conference. Hugh Gilchrist, 
an officer from DEA supported Dignam in Brussels.  
3 The Australian Dictionary of Biography said that, “[a]s a lawyer Garran was in 
general far-sighted and meticulous rather than inventive. He was thoroughly aware 
that “constitutional law is not pure logic it is logic plus politics”, and he favoured a 
pragmatic, commonsensical approach to its interpretation.”  
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policy into the middle of the 1930s. Then responsibility for copyright 
policy matters passed to a departmental lawyer, Joe Tipping.  
In the late 1960s, Lindsay Curtis managed a number of lawyers dealing 
with a variety of subjects, including copyright policy. Until this period, 
the department managed copyright responsibilities as an adjunct to 
tasks perceived to be more important, and expended partial energy on 
copyright policy. Perceptions started slowly to change. Curtis supplied 
Nigel Bowen, the Attorney General, with extensive advice during the 
preparation of the 1968 copyright legislation, sparking more awareness 
of the international character of copyright law, and the possibility for 
Australia to share the prestige of international treaty development. 
Departmental differences and growth of distinctive 
copyright policy 
It should not be supposed that the requirements of international law 
allowed only one way of making or implementing copyright policy. In 
the 1930s, for example, the Comptroller General for Customs4 and the 
Postmaster General’s Department occasionally took issue with the 
perceived indulgence shown by Attorney General’s Department 
towards some copyright owners. The Postmaster General’s 
Department greatly resented APRA’s aggressive negotiating tactics 
towards the ABC, and the effect of its financial demands on the radio 
industry’s economic stability.  
The Postmaster General’s portfolio included responsibility for 
broadcasting policy and successive Ministers questioned the size  
of APRA’s takings and its distribution policy. One former holder of the 
portfolio said in Parliament in 1939 that APRA “practically points a 
gun at the heads of those in charge of broadcasting.” He went on to 
suggest that in response to criticisms, the Attorney General would 
declare his hands bound by the Berne Convention and pay no further 
attention.5  
                                                     
4 In the mid 1930s, the Comptroller General for Customs, responsible for 
enforcing import control restrictions, expressed irritation in an official note at the 
importunities of record companies claiming that suppliers were illegally importing 
records without authorisation.  
5 Tension between the Postmaster General and Attorney prefigured differences 
between the communications and legal portfolios over copyright policy in the 
1990s. 
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Experience probably justified this jaundiced view. Successive Attorneys 
in the period of the APRA wars commented that they could take no 
legislative or administrative action that undermined obligations under 
the Berne Convention. But neither they nor their department worried 
much about the domestic consequences of rigid interpretation of 
international legal norms. Until the commissioning of the Spicer Report 
and the preparation of the 1968 Copyright Bill, the department saw 
little reason to spend much time on policy deliberation.  
Undoubtedly, the department supported the aims of the Berne 
Convention and saw a necessity for Australia to work towards 
implementation of revisions. Arguments and conclusions about policy 
were more provisional. Officers like Curtis seemed to rely on firm 
assumptions rather than unchangeable convictions. 
Over time, however, assumptions hardened into certainties. In 1975, 
the department’s copyright lawyers were open-minded about claims for 
photocopying remuneration. 20 years and more later, they would not 
dream of questioning the necessity for the statutory licensing system or 
the basis on which CAL collected photocopying remuneration.  
By the 1990s, copyright policymaking in Australia resembled a game. 
The Attorney General’s Department umpired the rival claims of 
owners and users, the two categories of interest group fighting over 
reform proposals. The representatives of each interest stood on either 
side of the net. Backed by possession of the exclusive rights and the 
weight of self-interpreted tradition, copyright owners towered above 
their opponents, superior in every aspect of play. Their opponents, out-
muscled and desperate, scrapped around the margins of the court, 
losing most points.  
It seemingly did not occur to the Government to consider options to 
redress the imbalance of power. Balance did not call for favouritism but 
recognition that the copyright user groups, lacking the resources of 
their opponents, often did not press their arguments with the depth 
and acumen their case demanded. Then a change of Government in 
1996 brought a change of strategy. The new Liberal Coalition 
Government decreed that the Attorney General’s Department must 
share policy responsibility for the Copyright Act with the Department 
of Communications, IT and the Arts.6 
                                                     
6 The Attorney General’s Department retained sole responsibility for the 
administration of the Act. 
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Joint responsibility for copyright policy 
On its face, the Government’s decision seems a curious one. For the 
first time in the history of the copyright legislation, two departments 
exercised joint policy responsibility. The sharing of policy responsibility 
is both unusual and potentially dangerous. Government agencies 
frequently espouse subtly different principles. They often do not share 
sympathies. If conflicting principles and different sensibilities meet in 
practice, the result is likely to be stalemate. 
In the 1930s, the Attorney General’s Department cooperated with the 
Postmaster General’s Department to align copyright and broadcasting 
policy. The two departments looked on APRA’s activities with 
markedly different emotions. The Department of Communications, IT 
and the Arts, DOCITA, similarly felt differently from the Attorney 
General’s Department about certain protagonists in the contemporary 
copyright policy drama.  
Responsible, like its forerunner the Postmaster General’s Department, 
for broadcasting policy, DOCITA wished to encourage the 
dissemination of information and the growth of communications. 
Inevitably, its officers viewed with disfavour the use of copyrights to 
restrict the flow of information to maximise revenue.  
The explanation for the Government’s decision to split copyright 
responsibilities perhaps lies in its reformist enthusiasm. Cabinet 
probably deliberated the wholesale transfer of copyright legislation to 
DOCITA, a portfolio with responsibility for the technologies with 
which most copyright industries were vitally interested. Tradition, far 
more than logic, supported the Attorney General retaining portfolio 
responsibility for the legislation. His department did not administer 
industrial property legislation,7 why should it retain responsibility for 
copyright legislation? 
The proponents for change may have reasoned thus, but tradition 
proved a bulwark against a complete shift in portfolio responsibility. 
Cabinet agreed to piecemeal reform and split policy responsibilities 
while agreeing that the Attorney should retain administrative control of 
the Copyright Act. The compromise broke down eight years later, 
when the Government abandoned its radical experiment and granted 
the Attorney full policy control over the legislation.  
                                                     
7 IP Australia is responsible for patents, trademarks, designs and plant breeders 
rights legislation. 
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The splitting of policy responsibilities in 1996 produced a new 
approach to copyright policymaking at a moment of floodtide in 
international copyright law. The WTO’s 1994 Agreement on  
Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights, and the  
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, prescribed legislative standards that, if they were to be met, 
called for intense commitment. The TRIPS Agreement demanded the 
creation of new enforcement procedures, while the WIPO treaties 
provided, among other things, for the extension of copyright into the 
digital environment.  
Australia now committed to substantive changes to its copyright 
legislation and implementation of the so-called “digital agenda”. At the 
heart of the digital agenda lay the new right of communication to the 
public, which, once enacted, would allow copyright owners to control 
the transmission of copyright material over the internet. Together, the 
Attorney General’s Department and DOCITA embarked on the road 
to reform, cooperatively and with mutual goodwill. In 2000, the two 
departments delivered Australia’s biggest copyright reform since the 
passing the of the 1968 Act, the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) 
Act, which made the communication right a reality. 
Goodwill did not, however, mean the absence of controversy, nor did it 
produce unanimity in the interpretation of obligations or opinions 
about correct formulations of policy. In a real sense, the Government’s 
action in splitting policy responsibility rescued the digital agenda 
legislation from the increasingly narrow conceptualisations and 
rationalisations of the Attorney General’s Department, which, by the 
mid 1990s, reflexively supported the will of the copyright industries and 
the USTR.  
Concentrating its gaze on the bargains and accords of the WTO and 
WIPO, the department never consciously chose to adopt the formulas, 
slogans and principles invented in boardrooms and political offices 
across the United States. But TRIPS and the WIPO copyright and 
performances and phonograms treaties were emanations of US 
volition. By uncritically joining in, then promulgating, the international 
consensus, the department accepted American vision of how domestic 
copyright policy should be made and implemented. 
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Role of DOCITA 
DOCITA, less hidebound by the deadweight of legal scholarship, 
begged to differ with the vision endorsed by the Attorney General’s 
Department. Like its ancestor, the Postmaster General’s Department, it 
filled the role of copyright gadfly, biting and annoying its lumbering 
sister agency, stabled at the Robert Garran Offices one kilometre down 
the road. More importantly, the officers of the Intellectual Property 
Branch at DOCITA succeeded in doing what their counterparts at the 
Attorney General’s Department had for some years failed to do: they 
critically interrogated the arguments of the whole coterie that 
compromised the great beast of copyright self-interest. 
Their outrageous presumption stemmed from the naïve confidence of 
relative youth and the willingness of the Communications Minister, 
Richard Alston, to support questioning of the central canon of the case 
for maximum owners’ rights – the idea that in the digital domain, 
copyright owners should not be subject to the limitations and 
exceptions that otherwise applied to copyright transactions. According 
to the argument, in the digital environment, fair dealing, library 
exceptions and the other devices for increasing dissemination would 
cause havoc to owners’ rights.  
Digital technology permitted rapid, mass reproduction of material and 
the communication of copies. According to copyright owners, in the 
digital realm, any qualification of owners’ rights would work like a virus, 
multiplying diminutions of the owners’ entitlements. Curiously, the 
argument turned on its head the old principle that copyright law must 
expand to enable the owner to control the applications of new 
technology. Now, proponents seemed to argue, the law must contract 
to allow owners to prevent misuse of technology. 
Alston’s departmental officers regarded the argument with scepticism 
and listened to the contrary claims of the copyright user groups, such as 
libraries, with more consideration than they were used to. The contrary 
argument held that if in the digital domain the exclusive rights operated 
truly exclusively, opportunities for free access to information on the 
internet would increasingly diminish, destroying the idea of a great 
worldwide communications exchange. 
Alston’s portfolio included responsibility for broadcasting, film and 
media policy and also the regulation of internet commerce. Unlike  
the Attorney General, he was required to pay attention to commercial 
users of copyright material, who, though they might also be  
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copyright owners, needed to ensure that the pathways of digital 
communication were not choked by impassable hedges of proprietary 
rights. So he supported vigorous questioning of arguments for 
maximum rights and endorsed the extension of copyright exceptions 
into the digital environment. 
Dismantling import controls 
At the same time, he pressed for the overthrow of the vestige in the 
Copyright Act of British mercantilist oppression, the import monopoly. 
Restrictions in the Act prevented Australian retailers from importing 
non-pirated copyright product without the consent of the copyright 
owner. The controls, first created in the 18th century, and carried into 
the British Copyright Act of 1842, were designed to allow British 
publishers to control the supply of books throughout the Empire.  
Progressively extended, they allowed record, film and software 
companies to regulate the import of their products into Australia and 
prevent domestic suppliers from importing the same product from 
cheaper foreign sources, such as wholesalers in the original market. 
Control of supply meant control of price and, depending on the 
commercial decisions of the copyright owner, restrictions on consumer 
choice. The Labor Government attacked book import restrictions in 
the early 1990s, but it wilted before the counter-attacks of the 
publishing industry and legislation passed in 1993 barely impinged on 
industry practice. 
The Coalition Government, elected on a platform of economic reform, 
proved more determined, turning its sights on the recording industry. 
Legislation passed in 1998 amended the Copyright Act to allow 
distributors to import non-pirated sound recordings without the 
owner’s consent. This reform, achieved in the teeth of ferocious 
industry opposition, represented possibly the purest blow delivered to 
vested interest in the history of Australian copyright legislation. It 
resulted, as intended, in lower retail prices and greater choice. Its other 
salutary effect could hardly be underestimated, for the passage of 
legislation signified that reform uncorrupted by the claims of sectional 
interest is achievable.  
Amidst the seemingly unceasing elaborations of rights that confine 
rather than liberate, even one such small departure from the  
prevailing will to enclosure suggested a remarkable possibility: the 
venous breathing organism of copyright is mortal and therefore subject 
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to limitation. The Government, naturally, ventured no such  
outlandish view. It looked pragmatically at the possibility of reform  
and slowly and inconsistently tried to dismantle other import 
restrictions. In 2003, further legislation permitted the parallel 
importation of computer programs, but controls continued to apply to 
books, periodicals and films. 
The digital agenda reforms and the aftermath 
New legislation 
The attitude of the Attorney General’s Department to questions of 
copyright policy can be gauged from the fact sheet it published in 2001 
to explain the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act passed the 
previous year. The document described the reform as if it were 
intrinsically justified, a measure to help realise property’s total dominion 
in a fugitive world of abstractions: 
The development of new communications technologies has exposed gaps in copyright 
protection under the Copyright Act 1968 (the Act). For example, the Act 
currently only grants copyright owners limited, technology-specific transmission rights, 
e.g., the right to broadcast only extends to ‘wireless’ broadcasts, and the existing 
cable diffusion right does not extend to sound recordings or television and radio 
broadcasts. Further, copyright owners currently do not have effective rights in relation 
to the use of their copyright material on the Internet. 
The fact sheet elucidated no further. The reader looking for 
justification searched in vain. So far as could be discerned, the 
department looked on copyright law as the expression of fathomless 
Providence manifesting a will that must be obeyed. Thus spake 
Providence: owners are without sufficient rights, let them have rights. 
Hearing these words from the copyright divinity, the lawyers of the 
Attorney General’s Department set about their salvific work with fear 
and trembling, or at least earnest certainty. Alston’s department, not 
convinced about copyright’s supernatural nature, took a different view. 
For this reason, the amending legislation extended existing restrictions 
on owners’ rights into the digital environment. The fact sheet 
grudgingly disclosed that: 
Users of copyright material, such as libraries and educational institutions, are 
concerned about being able to maintain reasonable access to copyright material in a 
digital environment. Carriers and Internet service providers (ISPs) are worried about 
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facing uncertain liability for copyright infringements which are committed by third 
parties whilst using their facilities. 
As the fact sheet reported, the digital agenda legislation changed the 
Copyright Act in five ways. It created a new exclusive right of 
communication to the public, carried into the digital environment 
exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright owners (including 
educational and other statutory licences), introduced new enforcement 
measures, limited and clarified the third party liability of internet 
carriers and introduced a statutory licence scheme for the 
retransmission of free-to-air broadcasts. In so doing, it created a 
regulatory framework for internet transactions, the effect and benefits 
of which only later historians can fully judge.  
Exit DOCITA  
One truth about the legislation is easily discernible. Though the 
amendments could mostly be said to fulfil copyright’s divine plan,  
the meddling of DOCITA imparted the stain of sacrilege to the  
ritual of remaking the copyright law. By fighting for exceptions to 
owners’ rights, DOCITA aroused the wrath of the copyright daemon. 
Copyright owner groups, channellers of this fierce spirit, demanded its 
propitiation.  
The Government offered DOCITA, the author of so much cosmic 
disturbance, as a sacrificial victim. In 2004, it revoked the department’s 
joint custody of office copyright policy, returning the copyright 
legislation to the exclusive ministrations of the Attorney General’s 
Department. But the various proxies of industries and associations 
were not appeased. They insisted that Australia demonstrate obedience 
to the cosmic will, preferably by deleting from the Act the exceptions 
to the communication right. 
The Government reluctantly admitted that the collective willpower of 
user groups and the public prevented it from taking this desirable step. 
However, the path to deliverance instantly suggested itself. What better 
way to pacify an enraged copyright spirit than by offering new rights 
that augmented the temporal manifestations of its power? The  
United States now helpfully guided the Government on the road to 
liberation, freeing it from the curse brought on the nation by 
DOCITA’s impieties. 
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Restrictions on user rights  
Under a free trade agreement with the US that took effect in 2005, 
Australia agreed to amend the Copyright Act in ways calculated to 
please copyright proponents. Among other things, the agreement 
required Australia to extend the term of copyright by 20 years,  
change the definition of material reproduction to encompass temporary 
copying that facilitates the playing of infringing material, protect 
electronic rights management information, introduce new criminal 
provisions and impose restrictions on the circumvention of 
technological protection measures. 
Though the Government initiated inquiries to determine the extent to 
which users should be permitted free electronic access to copyright 
material, 100 years after the first federal Copyright Act, Australia 
enjoyed little of the legislative freedom exercised by the great 
parliamentary generation of 1905. In 1905, legislators knew of the 
Berne Convention and shared a conviction that the rights of authors 
must be recognised.  
They felt no need to follow the letter of the Convention and they 
considered themselves to be setting precedents far ahead of the 
copyright statutes of Britain and its other possessions. They were 
characterised above all by a spirit of independence that inspired them 
to deprecate the backwardness of British policy, attack publishers and 
declare the United States a pirate nation plundering the works of 
foreign writers. That spirit vanished within seven years, but for a short 
time an emancipated generation could make copyright policy without 
deference to Westminster or Berne. 
From the time of the 1912 Act, uniformity was the catchcry of policy 
but adherence to the Berne Convention, and the intermediatory 
provisions of British imperial law, created a psychology still distinct 
from that manifested by contemporary lawmakers. When Parliament 
passed the 1968 Copyright Act, few doubted that Australia must 
comply with the requirements of the Convention but the international 
law seemingly offered latitude to work out domestic arrangements 
without excessive foreign interference. No-one guessed that in 30 years 
the content of copyright laws would form an integral part of trade 
negotiations and underpin the trade ascendancy of a single nation.8  
                                                     
8 And the group of other net exporters of intellectual property. 
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No-one guessed either that the dynamic influence of the United States 
on international copyright law-making would cause the length of 
Australian copyright legislation to grow radically in size. At the close of 
1980, the year in which Parliament passed the most significant 
amendments to the copyright legislation since its passage in 1968, the 
Copyright Act numbered 112 pages. Twenty five years later, the Act 
numbered 516 pages. By 30 March 2007, the reprinted legislation, 
which now included amendments implementing the US-Australian free 
trade agreement, had grown to 678 pages.  
By 2005, the thinking of Australian policymakers and bureaucrats 
seemed almost indistinguishable from that of the USTR. The Attorney 
General’s Department, and its partner in policy servility, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, examined questions of fair 
use but their officers were quite unable to separate Australian national 
interest from US trade interest. The dazzle of power supplies only a 
partial explanation for their failure. The truer cause of the collective 
myopia is the lawyer’s tendency to examine form not substance, to 
swim on the surface and not dive to the depths.  
Government lawyers really believed that the TRIPS Agreement and 
WIPO Copyright Agreement, and the complex bi-lateral trade 
agreements negotiated by the US with countries around the globe, 
obeyed an irresistible internal logic that must be followed. They were 
right only to the extent that Australia, if it acceded to multilateral 
agreements, or signed unilateral ones, could not resile from 
implementing them. But the failure to interrogate the logic of the 
agreements, to see what economic motives lay behind them, resulted  
in a surrender of independence that would have shocked the generation 
of 1905.  
By 2005, obtuseness and the politics of economic power determined 
Australian copyright policy. Policymakers, learnedly explaining the 
obligations of international law, obediently agreed – in the interests of 
the nation – to Australia’s status a tributary of the American hegemon. 
The greatest irony is that 100 years earlier, Australian politicians 
attacked with great vehemence the copyright policy of the United 
States, and even proposed legislation to strike at American publishers. 
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The Age of America – copyright, trade and imperial 
hegemony  
Conditions in the copyright world after its acceptance of the American 
peace seemed to fulfil the mysterious words of St Mark’s gospel: “For 
he that has, to him shall be given, and he that has not, that also which 
he has shall be taken away from him.” That this was so owed nothing 
to divine ordinance and everything to calculated human action.  
The availability of international copyright enforcement procedures 
using the processes of the WTO, and worldwide acceptance of the 
protection standards enjoined by the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO 
treaties, entrenched America’s economic advantage. Countries like 
Australia, which hoped to barter trade concessions with the US at the 
WTO, and in bilateral trade agreements, eventually discovered an 
unpleasant truth: like Rome and Britain before it, the United States 
typically negotiates from a position of implacable strength. 
To the US, more was given, and from Australia, more was taken. 
Hoping to secure greater access to protected agricultural markets, 
Australian negotiators, the trade minister and the bureaucratic devotees 
of American power, agreed to the legislative demands of the USTR. 
The free trade agreement signed in 2004 helped to maximise the 
copyright owner’s advantage but the advantage lay with the exporters 
of copyright products: the US copyright industries. As they grew 
stronger, the US prospects of Australian agricultural exporters seemed 
to vanish like Canberra’s morning mist. 
The strangely lopsided bargain struck in 2004 mirrored similar pacts 
agreed to by the United States and other supplicant nations hoping to 
coax reciprocal benefits from the world’s copyright powerhouse. 
Nothing stopped the march of US power or the progress of its 
copyright industries. Harnessed brilliantly and ruthlessly by the USTR, 
the international trade system fortified the comparative advantage of 
the US in the production of intellectual property. 
How did the age of America come to pass? What did it reveal? What 
did it portend? The answers to these questions cast light on the larger 
question. For what purpose were copyright laws made in the English-
speaking world, and for whom? 
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Economics and politics  
The US ascendancy in the production and export of copyright products 
is powerfully illustrated by annual national trade statistics. In 2005, the 
US copyright industries, the movie, television, software, publishing and 
music industries, contributed nearly US$820 billion to national GDP. If 
the contribution of related industries, such as the retailers and 
distributors of copyright content, is included in the calculation, the total 
contribution rises to nearly $1.4 trillion, over 11 per cent of GDP. In 
2005, the copyright industries recorded foreign sales of over $110 
billion, ahead of nearly all other industrial sectors, including 
aeronautics, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and manufacturing. 
Most importantly, in the same period copyright industries accounted 
for nearly 13 per cent of real total national economic growth. Industry 
statistics disclose that in the 20 years after the passing of the US 
Copyright Act in 1976, the industries’ contribution to US GDP grew by 
over 240 per cent. Official and private reports projected that growth of 
the GDP and export contribution of the copyright industries would 
continue and far outstrip that of any other industrial sector. 
When the International Intellectual Property Alliance, a coalition of 
copyright industry representative groups,9 released its annual economic 
survey at the US Capitol in 2007, the Republican Representative  
Lamar Smith outlined why the US government took intellectual 
property policy seriously. 
What is clear from this and previous studies of the copyright industries is that their 
contribution to this country’s economic growth continues to increase in size  
and importance. These statistics call upon our own government and governments 
throughout the world that also experience the rapid growth of their IPR sectors  
to redouble their efforts to nurture these industries through adoption of  
modern legislation that takes into account changes in technology and through 
vigorous enforcement.  
Copyright industries are uniquely dependent on governments’ willingness to enforce 
good laws, particularly as globalization expands and internet and broadband 
penetration escalates rapidly around the globe. Indeed, as our citizens and creators 
look to the great potential of a world of e-commerce, the legal and secure transmission 
                                                     
9 Its members are: Association of American Publishers, Business Software Alliance, 
Entertainment Software Alliance, Independent Film and Television Alliance, 
Motion Picture Association of America, National Music Publishers’ Association, 
Recording Industry Association of America. 
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of valuable copyrighted content over the Internet will be at the centre of continued 
growth and productivity in the US economy. Yet this continued growth is in danger. 
We should not forget that unchecked piracy of copyrighted materials, both here and 
abroad, threatens both US growth and US jobs. 
At the same time, the head of the Motion Picture Association of 
America, Dan Glickman, a former Democrat House Representative 
explained how industry statistics influenced trade negotiations. 
When I was a member of Congress, this is the sort of information I would use to 
help me understand an issue. When the US Trade Representative sits down to 
negotiate with China about IP issues, this is the sort of information she draws on. 
That’s why we do this. 
A few months earlier, the Deputy US Trade Representative, Karen 
Bhatia, addressed a meeting of the National Academy of Recording 
Arts and Sciences in Washington. She noted, for the benefit of her 
music industry audience, that the US accounted for about 40 per cent 
of the US$34 billion global music market. The US copyright industries, 
she said, were at the “forefront”’ of US export growth. The trend was 
“not going to slow down … as more and more developing countries 
grow their middle class and themselves become integrated in the global 
economy.” She then explained the “three components” of US trade 
policy: 1. Market access 2. Rules for secure e-commerce 3. Intellectual 
property protection. Discussing the third component, she said: 
First – it’s incredibly important. Given the United States’ strength in IP-intensive 
industries, having in place laws, systems and regimes that protect US intellectual 
property abroad is perhaps the most important trade enforcement challenge we face. 
And – I should note – having in place such laws, systems and regimes should be 
important to our trading partners, many of whom are themselves trying hard to 
develop their own IP-intensive industries. 
She highlighted the successes enjoyed by the USTR, including the 
signing of free trade agreements including ‘rigorous IP commitments’,10 
and concluded by explaining the US’s determination to continue to 
press for high standards of copyright protection and enforcement. 
And so we will not stop. We will continue to advance our agenda. As we do that, I 
hope that we can count on all of you in the music industry to continue your strong 
                                                     
10 “We have successfully negotiated rigorous IP commitments in the FTAs we have 
concluded, and we remain committed to keeping international standards for IP 
high.” 
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support for free trade. Your voice matters. The success of the free trade agenda is not 
something any of us should take for granted … we believe that free trade is worth 
the effort to defend and advance, on behalf of the nation’s economy and the American 
workers, farmers and businesses that depend on the prosperity of our economy. 
As Bhatia’s speech showed, the Office sometimes needs to inveigle and 
rally even its natural supporters. It is not an invincible force 
omnisciently securing a global US trade hegemony. Its policy does not 
enjoy the unified support of the US polity and the USTR does not 
regard trade bargaining as an easy process with predictable results. 
Trade officers seem truly to view trade concessions that appear 
evanescent to foreigners as the harbingers of domestic hardship. Bhatia 
gave no indication that the USTR saw the US’s overwhelming 
comparative advantage in key sectors – such as intellectual property – 
as a predictor of one-side bargains. From the USTR’s perspective, the 
US must fight for free trade (or more accurately, free trade advantages) 
tooth and nail. 
The genesis of US copyright trade policy 
For all that, hindsight suggests much more than the semblance of 
design and forethought in the USTR’s campaign for the international 
harmonisation of copyright standards and the global acceptance of 
strict enforcement protocols. In carrying out this program, the Office 
worked together with the US copyright industries explicitly accepting 
the assumption – expressed in the comments of Lamar Smith and  
Dan Glickman – that the interests of the industries and the nation  
were indivisible. 
The beginnings of cooperation, and the genesis of the USTR’s 
copyright trade policy lie in the 1970s. In that decade, many 
policymakers were demoralised by flooding Japanese imports, inflation 
and the rising evidence of US economic decline. The seemingly 
unstoppable growth of the Japanese electronics and computer 
manufacturing industries suggested to some Americans that their 
country would soon be supplanted as the world’s leading producer of 
sophisticated technology. Apparent decline, however, masked the 
beginnings of remarkable economic metamorphosis.  
The US remained, at the end of the 1970s, by far the world’s dominant 
economic power. But reforms designed to liberalise the financial 
system, and an emphasis on the so-called knowledge economy opened 
the way to greater economic ascendancy. So far as the political rise of 
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the copyright industries is concerned, the transformative surge resulted 
from collective private action and the achievements of one sector in 
particular – the software industry. US overlordship in the copyright 
world thus came from the same source that created the panoply of 
exclusive rights throughout the world: calculated economic self-interest.  
The staggering success of the software industry, or any other industry, 
did not depend on maximal intellectual property rights, but extensive 
proprietary rights undoubtedly worked in favour of IBM and newer 
giants like Apple and Microsoft. In 1970s, the computer software 
industry staked its claim for domestic copyright protection, and then 
looked abroad, demanding that countries like Australia follow the US 
pattern. The rise of the software industry, and the PC revolution, 
testified to the value of lobbying for proprietary rights, leading other 
copyright industries to perceive the value of co-opting government to 
achieve economic goals. 
Although industry and government cooperation to create a framework 
for the international enforcement of intellectual property rights began 
in the 1980s, 1976 is the watershed year of the American copyright age. 
In 1976, the US legislature passed a new Copyright Act, which replaced 
the statute of 1909. The new Act recognised copyright in computer 
programs and introduced the schema of protection familiar to 
signatories of the Berne and Rome Conventions. For the copyright 
industries it represented an apotheosis, albeit incomplete, recognising 
the range of economic and distributive rights that would allow the 
industries to exert iron control over the production and dissemination 
of material. Thus empowered, they were ready to carry the fight for 
draconian enforcement of rights to Congress and then across the seas. 
The 1980s 
The US government listened with friendly ears to demands for a 
strategy for rights enforcement in foreign jurisdictions. In the early 
1980s, the calls came not only from the copyright industries but the 
immensely powerful pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors. The 
leaders of industry enmeshment with government were the companies 
Pfizer and IBM, and they were joined by companies such as Monsanto 
and mainstays of the entertainment industry like Warner 
Communications. In 1984, the formation of the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance created an insistent new voice heard 
regularly since in the offices of Capitol Hill and the USTR. 
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A pair of Australian scholars has shown that the industries channelled 
their influence mostly through the powerful Advisory Committee on 
Trade Negotiations, a body established to ensure that trade policy 
reflected industry needs.11 In the early 1980s, Pfizer’s CEO, Edmund 
Pratt, became chair of the ACTN, and assisted by IBM’s chairman, 
John Opel, a committee member, he established an intellectual property 
task force that made recommendations which formed the basis of the 
US’s intellectual property trade strategy. These business visionaries, and 
Jacques Gorlin, a Washington lawyer who conceived the idea of linking 
IP rights with the GATT negotiations, lit the way forward.  
Implementing their strategy, the US pressed for international agreement 
on stringent, enforceable intellectual property standards, negotiated 
bilateral agreements to fill the lacunae in protection, and rigorously 
policed international compliance with IP standards. In the 1980s, 
changes to trade legislation transformed the Office of the USTR into 
an agent of the industries. Trade concessions available to designated 
developing countries were revoked if they did not effectively curtail 
piracy and counterfeiting. The Special 301 WatchList, introduced in 
1988, continues to provide a running log of nations under USTR 
surveillance for alleged failure to implement regulatory or enforcement 
obligations. The US threatens, and can impose, trade sanctions for 
deemed non-compliance under Special 301. 
With the formation of the WTO in 1994, the proselytising of the 
ACTN and IIPA, the lobbying of various industry groups, the 
compliance of trade negotiators, and the cooperation of the EC and 
Japan, finally resulted in the schema devised 15 years earlier. The 
WTO’s General Council oversees three subsidiary councils, one of 
which is responsible for TRIPS, and also supervises dispute resolution. 
Under the rubric of TRIPS, the USTR monitors international 
compliance with intellectual property standards, and threatens 
delinquent nations with sanctions under Special 301 or action under the 
WTO’s dispute settlement procedures. 
 
                                                     
11 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos have published a number of works on the 
alignment of IP objectives with US trade policy. See e.g. Global Business Regulation, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000 and Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy?, Earthscan, 2002. Much of the detail in this chapter on government-
business links in US trade policy relies on their research. 
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Individual agency and industry motivations 
The American age, symbolised in political terms by the importance 
accorded by the WTO to intellectual property norms and their 
enforcement, is thus the remarkable achievement of business leaders 
working to achieve economic ends through formal political means. 
Their successful co-opting of politicians and politics is not the least of 
their accomplishments. Perhaps their greater success lies in the 
simplification of reality to present a message now treated as self-evident 
by most copyright policymakers: piracy of products produced or 
exported by the US copyright industries is not merely a violation of 
international law but a moral evil that threatens creativity and therefore 
continued production. 
US ascendancy in the production of copyright material testifies to the 
unceasing ingenuity and energy of American capitalism and an ever-
present American cultural genius. US leadership in the politics and 
economics of copyright, on the other hand, is not the automatic 
consequence of creative pre-eminence. To a significant degree, it results 
from calculation and intelligent forethought.  
Deliberation, planning and coordinated action were necessary for the 
copyright industries to begin to achieve their economic goal of 
defeating global piracy. This goal is directed towards revenue 
maximisation and is not usually fuelled by serious concern that piracy 
threatens the existence of the industries. The creation of a global 
framework for attacking piracy is the latest, and most extraordinary, 
product of a propagandising tendency evident throughout the history 
of copyright law. 
This tendency can be discerned in the calculated use of the political 
process to mould the law to deliver a benefit (authors’ rights advocates 
and all the copyright industries) or protect against perceived harm  
(the phonographic industry). The political language of political 
propagandists is often moralising, perhaps because industry 
representatives preaching ruin and desolation believe the horror  
they describe.  
Alternatively, they may rely on hyperbole to conceal limitations in their 
arguments. At any rate, they usually make their arguments with skill, 
persuasiveness and sometimes an element of judicious cunning.  
Thus US advocates speak of copyright piracy as theft, ignoring the 
possibility that organised copyright infringement is usually a response 
to price discrimination. 
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Copyright history manifests another tendency which American 
indignation over piracy confirms. Copyright proponents are motivated 
by economic needs not moral qualms. In Australia, APRA and CAL 
exalted the moral entitlement of copyright owners to remuneration yet 
both organisations sought unrelentingly to squeeze the most revenue 
from the fattest, slowest partridge in the pear tree.  
The recording industry, which angrily denounces pirates for destroying 
the livelihoods of artists, happily built its early profits on pirate (that is, 
unauthorised) recordings of the works of composers and lyricists. 
Publishers and record companies defended distribution monopolies as 
bulwarks against the supply of pirated product felt no concern about 
using the monopolies to fix prices. The greatest irony, however, lies in 
the moral fever of the US as it spreads its message of copyright 
necessity throughout the world. For the copyright policeman was once 
a pirate. 
A pirate nation and the Australian response 
US practice in the 19th century 
The United States, although an observer at all conferences of the Berne 
Union, did not become a party to the Convention until 1989. For most 
of its copyright history, its domestic law did not recognise the principle 
of reciprocity that is the basis of international copyright relations. US 
law provided that copyright only subsisted in works printed or made in 
the United States. Consequently, any books printed overseas could be 
copied in the US and the copier would own the copyright. 
In the 19th century, Britain and its possessions12 regarded the United 
States as a piratical market, and the indifference of the American polity 
to loud appeals for reform aroused great indignation among  
politicians and publishers. During his first American reading tour in 
1841, Charles Dickens attacked American copyright practices. His zeal 
backfired: the American press, including a young New York news 
editor called Walt Whitman, wrongly charged him with disliking 
America. Few Americans took any notice of his views. The United 
States, wanting to keep prices low for readers, and provide advantages 
                                                     
12 Including Australia, although damage to Australian authors was slight and the 
Australian public might have welcomed the importation of cheap American 
editions.  
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to the local publishing industry, happily disregarded foreign 
opprobrium – even the fulminations of Australian politicians. 
Throughout the 19th century, US publishers printed the works of 
foreign authors without compensation. Even a treaty agreed with 
Britain at the end of the 19th century allowing for international 
copyright did not lead to total reciprocity. For most of the 20th century 
British editions were marked ‘Not for sale in the USA’. But the United 
States remained oblivious to foreign criticism. To British authors and 
publishers, America loomed darkly across the Atlantic, the great pirate 
nation. But they were helpless to strike back and quite unable to secure 
remunerative access to the world’s greatest publishing market.  
The country’s history as a copyright pirate stands in ironic counterpoint 
to its present status as global copyright enforcer. Today the US 
threatens economic sanctions against importing nations that fail to 
institute the copyright standards decreed by the WTO or enforce rights 
rigorously. Its prosecutorial zeal is not limited to developing nations. 
The US lists countries on the Special 301 WatchList in a three-tiered 
hierarchy: countries in tier one may be threatened with trade sanctions 
and the threat may after a period translate into sanctions. Australia has 
been listed in tier two on a number of occasions.  
A symbolic blow  
In the 19th century, few Americans saw practical value in international 
copyright. American practice, though it had little effect on the fortunes 
of Australian authors, aroused considerable scorn and criticism in 
Australia. In 1905, Australian politicians (whose present day successors 
willingly accept American strictures on the evils of copyright piracy), 
felt strongly enough to urge a symbolic blow against the great infringer.  
Their particular concern with this issue is surprising. In 1905, modern 
pirated editions of Henry Lawson were appearing on the American 
market but the problem of American piracy mainly affected  
British publishers. The idea that the fight would be better left to the 
British to prosecute does not seem to have crossed the minds of 
Australian legislators. Far removed from the emanations of disgust 
crossing the Atlantic, they were outraged at the slight to Britain’s 
commercial interest. 
Australians probably suffered more from the commercial practices of 
British publishers than the production of cheap editions by American 
publishers. In any case Britain had ratified American practice in an 1891 
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Treaty between the two nations, with the result that protests made out 
of loyalty to Britain were meaningless. Politicians may have thought 
that the US law prejudiced nascent Australian publishers who could  
not – unlike their larger British counterparts – afford the costs of 
printing editions in the United States, and so were unable to secure 
American copyright. But even this argument, although strictly true,  
was unrealistic.13  
A number of parliamentarians demanded a stiff response to US 
practice. They shared a simple aim: let the legislation impose, in the 
words of William Webster, a Labor MP, “a duty on American books, 
which would place on American authors a disability equivalent to that 
now placed on Australian authors who wish to register in America.” 
Their philosophical reasons were equally succinct. As Webster said, 
they wanted to “secure fair play in America, and to do justice to 
Australian authors.” 
When Andrew Fisher, later Labor Prime Minister, pointed out that the 
British authorities were “yearly making representations” to their US 
counterparts, he received a terse reply from Richard Crouch, a 
Protectionist MP. “Unfortunately,” said Crouch, “Imperial 
Governments, for the most part, belong the Manchester school, and 
they push their free-trade views to such an extent, that they are not 
prepared to defend British authors and publishers. They are opposed to 
a policy of retaliation …” 
The anti-Americans were evidently not acquainted the views of Senator 
De Largie, expressed when the Senate considered the American 
question a few months earlier. Given the choleric nature of their 
opinions on the subject this was just as well. His calculations were 
utilitarian. A country like Australia, he said, with no native publishing 
industry to speak of, and a constituency of readers, not writers, would 
be best served by ignoring foreign copyright in the same way as the 
Americans had done. “I question whether we shall be consulting the 
public interest by passing such a Bill. For many years the United States 
                                                     
13 The greatest threat to the viability of Australian publishers was not restricted 
access to the US market but the profound imbalance in commercial strength 
between the under-capitalised local firm and its powerful and long-established 
British rival. Imperial legislation prohibited Australia from importing US editions 
direct from America, cutting off access to a large range of cheap books. And 
Australia itself obligingly ended all hope of access to American editions by banning 
their importation under the Customs Act. 
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has had no copyright law in the same sense as this. The result was that 
in America, books for which £1 would have had to be paid in the 
United Kingdom could be purchased for about 2s”.14 
The anti-Americans were tilting at windmills. As Littleton Groom, the 
Protectionist Minister for Home Affairs, pointed out, the 1905 
Australian Copyright Bill imposed on foreigners exactly the disability 
considered to be at the root of the American problem – that of making 
local printing and publication conditions for the grant of copyright.15 
And a decision to impose penalties on Americans would hurt 
Australians more than Americans. The anti-Americans were not 
abashed. When asked whether 80 million Americans would take any 
notice of the opinion of four million Australians, George Reid, leader 
of the Free Traders and former Prime Minister, said, “[t]hey might do 
so. But in any event the four million people have a right to look after 
themselves in a manly way.” 
The anti-Americans failed, but they made their mark as men of 
independent mind.16 Many took a robust view of Australia’s standing 
on a matter of principle, a view similar to that which sparked Britain’s 
1875 Royal Commission into copyright – the belief that a self-
governing nation (Canada) possessed the right to enact legislation 
potentially in conflict with imperial legislation. To these assertive 
spirits, Groom pointed out that penalising Americans in Australian 
legislation would conflict with the rights of Americans under the 
International Copyright Act 1886 and might therefore be ultra vires.17 
                                                     
14 When Senator Symon reproached De Largie that the US practised piracy he 
replied that so long as the result was that books were cheap he was not concerned.  
15 Defending the Copyright Bill, Groom referred more than once to British drafting 
precedents. Hugh Mahon, the Labor Member of Coolgardie burst out: “I do not 
suppose that all the intelligence in the world reposes in the mind of the British 
Parliamentary Draftsman.”   
16 H Mahon, Member for Coolgardie, ibid, p.7250.  
17 In reply, George Reid was unequivocal about the Commonwealth’s right to 
exercise unhindered its power under section 52 of the Constitution: “I think that 
rights granted under an Imperial Statute have nothing to do with an Australian law. 
The idea that they have requires to be suppressed.” In the Upper House, Senator 
Givens said section 51(viii) allowed Australia to legislate freely.17  “I do not hold 
with the idea that the Commonwealth Act should be subservient in the smallest 
degree to the Imperial Act.”  
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Conclusion 
 
A new creation born from demands embodied in a Swiss treaty, and the 
hectoring of industries, is not one that excites the imagination. Yet the 
bloodless annexation that created the modern system of copyright law 
is, in some ways, as significant as the dramatic conquests that made 
possible the empires of Rome, Spain and Britain. Like the enduring 
sovereignties of mind and spirit created by those powers, the copyright 
system is likely to last and to concentrate economic and social power in 
the hands of the lucky few – the owners of copyright, and the nations 
that export copyright material. 
Examining the history of copyright law is important because knowledge 
of the historical record allows policymakers to more accurately assess 
the truth of claims made by the importuners for legislative change. The 
historian’s interpretation of the record is implanted with bias and 
supposition, yet, even so, the interpreter reveals truths: what relevant 
people said and did, and the results of their words and deeds.  
Copyright law is a hybrid, human, factional creation that emerged from 
the efforts of individuals, groups, industries, and latterly, nations, to 
secure economic benefits and to protect themselves from economic 
harm. Often, the beneficiaries of copyright protection opposed each 
other. All were self-interested. The law did not result from the plan of 
legislators who intended to create a balance between the interest of 
owner and user, or to optimise social welfare by maximising productive 
incentive. The makers of the copyright system sought private economic 
advantage, and paid little heed to considerations of social welfare. 
Modern explanations of the purpose and function of copyright law are 
mostly false hypotheses. They justify proprietary rights that entrench 
the economic advantage of a minority and the social disadvantage of 
the majority. During the 20th century, copyright discourse mostly 
reflected the values of owners and concentrated on the necessity of 
expropriation. As legislation conferred on copyright holders possessory 
entitlements similar to those enjoyed by the owners of land and 
tangible things, attitudes to abstract property became increasingly 
devotional. Those baulking at expropriation were called trespassers, 
thieves, pirates. Then, as modern developments in liberal economics 
began to infiltrate government, politicians began to pay some attention 
to public needs. As the century ended, advocates asked why  
copyright material, encrypted, locked, foreclosed by law, stayed out of 
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the reach of those consumers who lacked the means to pay the price 
fixed by copyright owners.  
Politicians, however, did not allow the concern for consumer welfare to 
disturb official orthodoxy about the purpose of copyright legislation. 
The copyright law exists, according to most copyright proponents, to 
guarantee production. Without the incentive supplied by property 
rights, creators and industries would cease to produce and disseminate 
copyright material. In the new century, this theory continued to 
underpin legislative policy. Despite claims that legislation functioned to 
serve public and not private interest, governments legislated to permit 
far-reaching digital rights management practices, and restrictive copy 
protection and technical protection measures. Conversely, laws forbade 
circumvention of most types of protection.  
Copyright owners cast themselves in the role of victims. From 1999 
onwards, entertainment conglomerates pursued legal action against a 
string of peer-to-peer file sharers engaged in unauthorised copying of 
copyright material.18 They also revived distribution controls through the 
use of technology.19 Although copyright owners did not invariably 
succeed in litigation, legislative developments pointed to a future in 
which courts must in most cases find in their favour.  
In 2005, the US Supreme Court found that companies supplying peer-
to-peer software could be held liable for infringement by users.20 
Although observers were divided over the effect of the judgment, some 
considered that if courts relied on the logic expressed by some judges, 
copyright owners could ultimately prevent the sale of any technology 
that makes possible copyright infringement. Legislation inspired by the 
US copyright industries placed owners in a position to more effectively 
control the digital reproduction and distribution of copyright material, 
and the use of copyright products. 
Courts and juries struck punitively at individual defendants. Between 
2003 and 2007, the Recording Industry Association of America sued 
                                                     
18 A&M Records Inc v Napster Inc 239 F Supp 3d 1004 (9th Cir 2001), MGM Inc v 
Grokster Ltd 545 US 913 (2005), Arista Records Inc et al v Limewire Inc filed August 
2006, NYDC.  
19 See Brian Fitzgerald, “The Playstation Mod Chip: A Technological Guarantee of 
the Digital Consumer’s Liberty or Copyright Menace/Circumvention Device?”, 
Media and Arts Law Review (2005) Vol 10, No 1, 85-98, esp. discussion of the High 
Court’s approach to defining circumvention in Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony 
Computer Entertainment [2005] HCA 58. 
20 MGM Inc v Grokster Ltd 545 US 913 (2005). 
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26,000 people for the alleged use of music file-sharing software. 
Jammie Thomas, one of the thousands sued, refused to pay an out-of-
court settlement. On 4 October 2007, a federal jury in Minnesota 
ordered her to pay US$220,000 to six US record companies for offering 
songs online through a Kazaa file-sharing account.21 The damages 
awarded were equivalent to about five times Thomas’s annual salary.22  
In the developed world, the malign consequences of courts permitting 
copyright owners to create “copyright jails”,23 or, in other words, to 
exercise near total control over the dissemination and use of copyright 
material, are principally, though not wholly, economic. Unconstrained, 
producers will continue their time-honoured and slothful practices of 
overcharging and undersupplying, and of raking fees for the non-
commercial use of copyright material.  
By reviving, in different guises, a device invented to guarantee the 
profits of British publishers – distribution controls – they will increase 
profits by restricting the uses of copyright products. Even so, although 
inefficient production, supply and pricing causes social detriment, most 
consumers in the developed world can secure access to copyright 
material by paying a price premium. Though they may be unable to buy 
products priced too high, or not supplied because producers choose to 
ignore demand, they will secure access to much of the material they 
consider necessary to satisfy their needs.  
In the less developed world, the would-be consumer is more 
unfortunate. Price discrimination and supply restrictions (including 
limited electronic access) can place copyright material out of the reach 
of those for whom the material may be not merely an optional 
consumable but a vital source of knowledge and education. When 
restricted access results in national disadvantage, trade policy that 
insists on maximum rights for copyright industries creates a type of 
                                                     
21 Virgin Records America Inc et al v Jammie Thomas USDC (Minn) 2007 
22 The judge ruled that the jury could convict Thomas even if not presented with 
proof that her computer ran file-sharing software at the time record companies 
detected the infringement, or that she used her computer keyboard at the time of 
infringement.  The judge also advised jury members that the offering of files for 
downloading determined guilt: if they agreed that the defendant made files 
available, then in the absence of proof that another person downloaded files, they 
could find her guilty of file-sharing.  
23 See Brian Fitzgerald, “Copyright vision: copyright jails” in www.online 
opinion.com.au, 26 October 2006: “Let us not build Australia into some sort of 
copyright jail; let us prosper in the new economy with copyright vision.” 
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moral hazard injurious to nations – on the moral level, to the 
advantaged trading party, and on the material level, to the 
disadvantaged party.  
The disposition of property rights limits or increases social equality. If 
the citizens of less developed countries are unable to purchase 
copyright products or gain access to copyright material, they cannot 
hope for equality with their counterparts in the developed world. Nor 
can their nations create the cultures of creative capability that 
developed nations, the United States in particular, proclaim will result 
from the spread of intellectual property norms across the globe. 
For the less developed world, copyright absolutism and the strict 
enforcement of IP rights, are the harbingers of permanent 
disadvantage. The developed world’s unwillingness to truly 
acknowledge the special needs of the less developed countries, manifest 
in the swift repudiation in the 1960s of proposals for special access 
rights – involving the creation of something akin to a Third World 
copyright – entrenches the detriment. Nor are developed nations  
likely to modify fundamental policy. The economic benefits of 
copyright are too great. By one measure, the annual output of the US 
copyright industries is greater in value than the total output of the 
Australian economy.  
The 2004 “Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO”, instigated by 
Argentina and Brazil, enunciates a program for reconsidering WIPO’s 
conventional approach to the development of international intellectual 
property law. But whether international forums can persuade the 
international copyright industries to reconsider economic imperatives, 
or the United States its trade policy assumptions, is doubtful.  
Even so, the Age of America, though the creation of copyright 
industries, spreads catchcries of dissent from within the copyright 
system. Yearning to be free from the system’s constraints, some 
capitalists demand rights to control and distribute copyright 
information. The inventors of search engines, self-styled “access” 
corporations, companies chafing at government control of saleable 
information, and competitors hostile to others’ proprietary rights, 
clamour for change. Outside the United States, China, and perhaps 
India, both eager to use communications technology to create national 
advantage, may destabilise the assumptions of the USTR and 
international copyright lawmakers. 
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As the example of the United States shows, dynamic capitalist 
economies in the primitive stage of development are not friendly to 
ideas of property that constrains growth. Over time, however, such 
economies, as they produce goods that can be labelled copyright and 
sold for profit, learn to like possessory entitlements. Even the concerns 
of capitalists disgruntled by the limitations of copyright can probably be 
accommodated. Throughout the 20th century, copyright lawmakers 
showed a genius for syncretism and the copyright system may find a 
way to embrace the renegades who demand the freedom to assist the 
flow of information. 
Property relations determine social equality and welfare. Without 
property, liberal society is impossible. The history of the 20th century 
testifies grimly to the social misery created by State ownership of 
productive resources. But concentration of property ownership in 
private hands produces inequality. The history of copyright is a history 
of legislators creating rules that allow a few to control valuable subject 
matter.  
Conceptually, the owners of copyright are landlords, controllers of 
property for a lifetime and 70 years. Those who purchase and use 
copyright material are renters. Because of the rules of modern 
copyright law, the landlords’ holdings are vast. The renters are many 
and they pay inordinately high rents. Some – many, if the poorer 
countries are taken into account – cannot afford the rent, and are 
excluded, often permanently, from the liberal and productive benefits 
of access to copyright material.  
  
